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In response to Richard Momeyer's fascinating and disturbing story, three thoughts.
First, I couldn't help but wonder, sadly, why human beings would need a "benign invasion" of more advanced aliens to get us to work together to address and reverse global climate change and to transform our global economy in the direction of greater cooperation and justice. Although the Centaurians do contribute some new technologies previously unavailable to humans, everything else that they contribute is available to us already: near-unanimous scientific agreement about the magnitude of the problems we face and near-unanimous scientific agreement on what we need to do to avert disaster. All we lack, as Al Gore points out in An Inconvenient Truth, is the political will to act. What is it about the spectacularly dramatic arrival of the Centaurians that allows the humans in Momeyer's story to form that hitherto-lacking political will? Is it that the visibly superior intelligence of the Centaurians removes all possible doubt about the scientific facts, which would suggest that we refrain from acting now chiefly because of some lingering epistemological uncertainty? Or is that the sheer drama of their arrival serves as a sufficiently abrupt catalyst to awaken us out of our inertia? Second, the Centaurians' proposal for how we can reciprocate their planet-saving assistance is of course shocking, and shocking in a way that illustrates the many problematic features of our current treatment of nonhuman animals. I would expect most readers to view the Centaurians' proposal with moral horror. Yet consider all the ways in which it differs positively from our own current practices of meat-eating and animal experimentation: 1) The Centaurians ask our consent to agree to the practice; they do not simply impose it upon us. 2) The Centaurians propose the practice as a way for us to express gratitude for past benefits received.
3) The Centaurians propose to engage in the practice without subjecting their human food source to any physical or psychological pain. 4) The Centaurians are seeking to engage in the practice only because it is impossible for them to obtain its benefits in any other way. Our current treatment of nonhuman animals fails on every count.
Yet I also suspect that many readers will share my view that the Centaurian proposal is nonetheless more troubling, morally, than our current practices, despite its clear improvement over them on each of the four dimensions just cited. Our deep-seated resistance to countenance the Centaurian proposal, even as many of us continue to be meat-eaters ourselves, could be chalked up to mere speciesism: you just can't treat us in that way. But perhaps it also helps us grope toward some way in which we just are special. For example, as far as the first feature on my list above, we simply couldn't seek the consent of non-human animals to our treatment of them, indeed, seek their consent to anything, as they are by their nature creatures incapable of giving meaningful consent. Unlike us, they are incapable of weighing arguments for and against the proposal. They are incapable of wrestling with the moral issues surrounding it. However superior the Centaurians may be to us in intelligence, however more developed their technology, as well as their abilities to live together cooperatively and harmoniously, they share with us the fundamental ability to give or withhold consent to such a proposal, and to assess it through the lens of moral evaluation.
Finally, Momeyer leaves us dying to know what the Alpha Centaurians themselves decided about the similar proposal offered to their ancestors in their distant past. I do hope we find this out in the final pages of his story! On the one hand, the fact that they could make the proposal to us so calmly and chillingly suggests that they would not have been averse to accepting it themselves; they certainly don't seem to view it as a proposal that is sufficiently beyond the moral pale that they would not stoop to offer it. Yet I also feel pulled to speculate that if the Centaurians had indeed accepted such a proposal in the past, it would not have turned out to be the foundation on which their progress as a people was assured. I can't help wanting to believe that deontology and consequentialism come together here: that we simply don't get beneficial results for ourselves, for our species, for our planet, by allowing ourselves to be treated as mere means, rather than ends-in-ourselves. I would like to think that the Centaurians have flourished precisely because they refused such a proposal -that even though they are not beyond offering it to us, they were beyond accepting it for themselves. I like to think that they are asking us just because they hope that we will be wise enough to say no.
